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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION OR 
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION: PRIORITIES 
IN EDUCATING STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified School Dist.,l the 
Ninth Circuit held that a school district need neither provide 
nor bear the cost of providing certain individualized education-
al services to students with disabilities.2 A school district must 
furnish only those services outlined in an individualized educa-
tion plan (hereinafter "IEP"), developed annually by the local 
educational agency, for each individual with a disability.3 Re-
quired to supply a free appropriate education by federal law, a 
school district must offer the special education and related 
services necessary to meet the unique needs of the individual! 
However, a school district has no responsibility to render or 
pay for any special education or related services beyond those 
specified in the IEP. 5 
Additionally, with regard to education for children with 
disabilities, the Ninth Circuit ruled that until a party exhausts 
available administrative remedies provided by federal law, 
1. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(per Leavy, J. with whom Alarcon, J. and Kleinfeld, J. joined). 
2. [d. at 230. 
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5-6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D) (1988). 
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courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review complaints.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Kristy Dreher, a 7-year old student, registered in the Am-
phitheater Unified School District (hereinafter "Amphitheater") 
for the 1989-90 school year. 7 Amphitheater placed her at the 
Arizona School for the Deaf and Blind.s Dreher has been pro-
foundly deaf since birth.9 Her parents wanted her to learn to 
read lips and speak, rather than rely on sign language for 
communication. 10 
In 1989, Amphitheater evaluated the effects of various 
education methods on Dreher's ability to learn.ll The district 
found that an educational program which focused exclusively 
on oral methods would not work well for Dreher.12 Therefore, 
her individualized education program (hereinafter "IEP")13 
emphasized sign language instruction, but called for "oral 
methods with augmentative communication," including sign 
language, lip reading and oral training.14 
6. ld. at 235. 
7. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Ariz. 
1992). 
8. ld. at 755. 
9. ld. 
10. Dreher v. Ampitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Since the 19th century, educators have disputed the best method of teaching deaf 
children to communicate. Because sign language has a different structure from 
that of English, advocates of the spoken word maintain that "oralism" helps deaf 
persons assimilate into society. Oralists believe speaking and lip reading English 
is essential to success in the hearing world. This approach relies on using the 
English language and being able to speak, understand, read, and write in English. 
See Judith Randal & William Hines, The Deaf Speak Out; New Power for a Divid-
ed Minority, WASHINGTON POST, March 29, 1988, Health, at 15. 
11. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
12. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. Amphitheater based this conclusion on exten-
sive testing of Dreher's learning methods and her performance in a 2-year speech 
therapy program which used only oral/auditory methods. 
13. Local school districts must develop an individualized education plan [here-
inafter "IEpl ] which is a personalized plan designed to meet the unique education-
al needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5). 
14. See Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 756. "Oral training" involves teaching the 
communicator to speak. Many hearing impaired persons with hearing aids have 
achieved functional and recognizable speech. However, persons who have been 
profoundly deaf from birth (as is Kristy Dreher) have no concept of the sounds 
they create or those they wish to, and generally fail to attain the proficiency nec-
2
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Attempting to eliminate the sign language component of 
Dreher's IEP, her parents appealed the district's choice of 
teaching methods through the administrative hearing process 
made available by Amphitheater. 15 Amphitheater held due 
process hearings in December 1989 and January 1990.16 The 
hearing officer determined that Amphitheater's proposed meth-
odology was appropriate.17 Dreher's parents appealed this de-
termination to the Arizona Department of Education, which 
subsequently upheld the hearing officer's decision.18 
Dreher's parents, rather than allow Dreher to remain in 
the public school system and learn sign language during the 
two-month administrative appeals process, removed her from 
the Arizona Center for the Deaf and Blind and enrolled her in 
St. Joseph's Academy (hereinafter "the Academy").19 The 
Academy is a private school that forbids the use of sign lan-
guage and provides speech therapy specifically designed to 
teach lip reading and speaking.20 
essary to communicate orally with the hearing world. See Barbara Mathias, A Way 
of Hearing So to Speak, WASHINGTON POST, April 7, 1989, Style, at 5. 
15. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. In 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) and (c) (1988), the 
administrative remedies an educational agency must make available to appeal an 
IEP are outlined. 
Whenever a complaint has been received . . . the 
parents . . . shall have an opportunity for an impartial 
due process hearing . . . conducted by the State educa· 
tional agency or by the local educational agency or the 
intermediate educational unit, as determined by State law 
or by the State educational agency. 
[. . . • 1 
If the hearing required in [ . . . 1 this section is 
conducted by a local educational agency or an intermedi-
ate educational unit, any party aggrieved by the findings 
and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to 
the State educational agency which shall conduct an im-
partial review of such hearing. The officer conducting such 
review shall make an independent decision upon comple-
tion of such review." 
Dreher, 22 F.3d. at 231 n.3 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted). 
16. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. Federal law permits an appeal to a state educational agency. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1417 (1988). 
19. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
20. [d. Until the 1970's most deaf students learned to communicate orally, and 
were discouraged from using sign language. Today, factions of the deaf community 
advocate various communication methods including: American Sign Language (stan-
3
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Dreher's parents paid private school tuition at the Acade-
my from January 1990 to September 1990.21 They requested 
reimbursement from Amphitheater for the cost of Dreher's 
speech therapy provided at the Academy and payment for the 
costs of any oral method speech therapy necessary to Dreher's 
education in the future.22 Amphitheater contended that it had 
no obligation to pay for the special services, since speech thera-
py in lieu of other methods conflicted with Dreher's IEP.23 
Amphitheater claimed it offered Dreher the educational servic-
es specified in her IEP at public expense, had the family cho-
sen to avail themselves of those services.24 The district fur-
ther argued that it provided all of the services required by law 
by making the program specified in Dreher's IEP available at 
no cost to the family.25 
The administrative appeal, conducted by the Arizona De-
partment of Education, resulted in two determinations.26 
First, the hearing officer found that the IEP met the school's 
responsibility to provide Dreher with a "free and appropriate 
public education."27 Dreher's IEP would therefore not be 
changed to eliminate instruction using sign language.28 Sec-
ond, the hearing officer ruled that the school district need not 
grant Dreher a due process hearing to determine financial 
responsibility for the cost of the oral methods training at the 
Academy.29 
Following the final determination by the Arizona Depart-
ment of Education in June 1991, Dreher appealed to the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson 
dardized hand movements with a grammatical base unrelated to English), Signed 
English (a precise translation of English using signs and fingerspelling), Oralism 
(see supra note 10 for definition), or Total Communication (a combination of oral 
methods, lipreading, signing and fingerspelling). See Randal & Hines, supra note 
10. 
21. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. 
22. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 233. 
23. [d. 
24. See id. 
25. [d. 
26. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 761. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 762. 
4
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Division.3o The District Court held that the school district was 
not required to pay for the special services provided by the 
Academy, and that Dreher acted properly by exhausting the 
administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil action.31 The 
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Amphi-
theater.32 Dreher then appealed the District Court's ruling to 
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.33 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE CONTROVERSY OVER DEAF EDUCATION 
Deafness isolates individuals in a way unlike that faced by 
any other disabled population.34 Language and communica-
tion are basic parts of education, and, as a result, deaf children 
historically were considered uneducable.36 Students who enter 
school without a competent language base find themselves in a 
restricted environment that fails them linguistically, culturally 
and educationally.36 Proponents of educating deaf and hearing 
children separately have argued that isolation from one's own 
linguistic and intellectual potential is much more serious than 
physical isolation from able-bodied peers.37 
To minimize the potential isolation from peers and family 
members, deaf children must develop language.3s "Educators 
of deaf and hearing-impaired children want the same thing: 'to 
30. See generally Dreher, 797 F. Supp. 753. The Individuals with Disabilities 
in Education Act provides that "[a)ny party aggrieved by the findings and deci-
sion" of the state administrative hearings may bring a "civil action [in) any State 
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without 
regard to the amount in controversy." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988). 
31. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 762. 
32. [d. 
33. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
34. Suzanne J. Shaw, What's "Appropriate?"; Finding a Voice for Deaf Children 
and Their Parents in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 14 U. 
PuGET SOUND L. REV. 351 (1991). 
35. [d. See Oliver Sacks, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE 
DEAF 9 (1989). 
36. See Shaw supra note 34 at 369. 
37. [d. at 370. 
38. Elizabeth New Weld, Teaching the Deaf: 2 Schools of Thought Methods 
Differ on How to Give 'Priceless Diamond of Language', BOSTON GLOBE, November 
11, 1990, North Weekly, at 1. 
5
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give deaf children the priceless diamond of language at the 
earliest possible moment' .... But they differ on how to do 
that.,,39 Language is often considered a conduit of culture, and 
parents of deaf children must decide which language and 
which culture to embrace at first.40 Two opposite approaches 
dominate the controversy: oralism and sign language.41 
Sign language includes two basic components: American 
Sign Language (hereinafter "ASL") and Signed English.42 
American Sign Language, a manual language with its own 
grammar and syntax, has been declared an official foreign 
language to fulfill college requirements in some states.43 
Signed English, in which the manual ASL signs follow an 
English-based word order, is not viewed as a true language by 
ASL proponents.44 Rather, it combines ASL and English to 
assist deaf students to become more proficient in English.45 
At the other end of the spectrum is the oral philosophy, 
which descended from Alexander Graham Bell.46 Bell, who 
could sign well,47 argued against teaching children to join a 
deaf culture that isolates them from the hearing world.48 Ad-
vocates of the oral method argue that students who are taught 
to read lips and talk are better equipped to study in the main-
stream of regular classrooms with hearing children.49 They 
contend that it is easier to learn sign language later in life 
than to learn English.50 
The controversy between oralists and sign language propo-








46. Sound & Fury, Los ANGELES TIMES, November 21, 1993, Magazine, at 44. 
47. Id. Bell used sign language to communicate with his wife and mother, 
both of whom were deaf. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Daniel Ling, Ph.D., Modes of Communication in Educational Settings, 
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over which method is best for educating deaf children. 52 The 
issue becomes whether a government entity or an individual's 
parents should have the authority to decide what language will 
be used in educating a child.53 
B. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES IN EDUCATION ACT 
Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities in Edu-
cation ActM (hereinafter "IDEA") in 1975 as the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act (hereinafter "EAHCA").55 
EAHCA originated as an amendment to the Education for the 
Handicapped Act of 1970.56 Following a semantic trend, Con-
gress changed the name of EAHCA to IDEA in 1990.57 How-
ever, the original 1975 EAHCA language outlined many of the 
provisions present in the current IDEA.58 
In the IDEA, Congress explained the need for the legisla-
tion.59 The IDEA states that education is to be: (1) provided to 
all age eligible children with disabilities;(2) offered in the least 
restrictive placement appropriate; (3) provided at no cost; and 
(4) individualized for each student.so To receive federal funds 
under IDEA, a state must develop and implement a policy of 
providing free appropriate public education to all children with 
52. See, e.g., Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
53. [d. 
54. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 20, 25, and 42 U.S.C.). 
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Pub. L. No. 94-142, Sec. 
1 (1975). 
56. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970). 
57. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990 § 901(a)(3), Pub. 
L. No. 101-476 (1990). In the 1980's, the words "handicapped" and "disabled" as 
descriptive language began to be replaced by "people with disabilities" as more 
politically correct terminology. This semantic trend paralleled a growing civil rights 
movement which brought heightened social consciousness and acceptance of people 
with disabilities as a class in need of protection from discrimination under the 
law. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY (1993) (providing a detailed history 
of the disability rights movement). See also Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Crip' 
pies, Overcomers and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and 
Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341 (1993). 
58. See Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970). 
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. V 1993). 
60. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAw (1992). 
7
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disabilities within that state.61 
1. An Appropriate Public Education 
The IDEA defines "free appropriate public education" as: 
"special education and related services which (A) have been 
provided at public expense, under public supervision and direc-
tion, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate ... education in 
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the 
individual education program .... "62 
The IDEA mandates that each local educational agency is 
responsible for establishing, reviewing, revising, implementing 
and keeping IEP records for every student with a disability.63 
The IEP is to be developed at a meeting of the interested par-
ties, including "a representative of the local educational agen-
cy ... who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provi-
sion of, specially designed instruction . . . , the teacher, the 
parents or guardian ... and, whenever appropriate, [the] 
h 'ld "64 c 1 .... 
One objective of the IDEA is to provide an appropriate 
education tailored to the individual needs of each child.65 The 
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he educational opportunities 
provided by our public school systems undoubtedly differ from 
student to student, depending on a myriad of factors that 
might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate infor-
mation presented in a classroom."66 One plan for all students 
with disabilities or a generalized plan for each disability would 
be inappropriate, since each individual has different needs.67 
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993); 34 C.F.R. § 300.110 (1994). 
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401 (1994). 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(4),(6) (Supp. V 1993). 
64. [d. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 106 n. 175. See Johnson v. 
Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit, 757 F. Supp. 606, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (cur-
riculum created for hearing impaired student must be tailored to meet individual 
needs). 
65. Johnson, 757 F. Supp. at 617. 
66. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982). 
67. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 107. 
8
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Beyond the requirement that educational programming be 
individualized, details regarding content limits and related 
services within the definition of "appropriate" remain undeter-
mined in the statute.68 The Supreme Court has held that the 
primary responsibility for choosing the educational method 
most suitable to a child's needs is left to state and local educa-
tional agencies in cooperation with the child's parent or guard-
ian.69 However, clarification of ambiguity in individual cases 
is left to the courts. 70 
To evaluate whether an IEP is adequate and appropriate, 
courts must determine the answer to a central question, name-
ly whether the IEP "addresses the child's education needs so as 
to assure [some educational benefit to the child] in the least 
restrictive environment consistent with that goal."71 The IEP 
need not reflect the only appropriate choice nor the 
parents'choice nor the best choice, but only that which meets 
the minimum federal standards.72 
In developing an IEP, schools must find a compromise 
between the minimum federal standards and the best means 
available to educate the individua1.73 Parent participation in 
the development of an IEP can help elucidate the best means 
of educating a particular child.74 Based on experience and fa-
miliarity, a parent often knows the type of stimulus or rein-
forcement to which the child will respond and can learn.75 
Because of the value of this information in the IEP process, 
IDEA regulations provide detailed assurances for maximizing 
parental involvement.76 
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18). 
69. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
70. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 108-14. 
71. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm'n, 910 F.2d 983 (lst Cir. 1990). See also 
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. 
72. G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942 (lst Cir. 1991) (minimum 
standards require providing services which guarantee a reasonable probability of 
educational benefit). 
73. See id. at 948-49. 
74. [d. at 948. 
75. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 107. 
76. [d. These requirements include providing sufficient notice to parents and 
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2. A Free Public Education 
The term "free" in "free appropriate public education" 
means that the educational program must be provided at pub-
lic expense.77 If a school district is unable to provide appropri-
ate education services to fulfill an IEP utilizing its existing 
staff, outside resources are often used.78 Where a child is re-
ferred to a private agency by a school system, it is the state 
educational agency's responsibility to ensure that the program 
is provided at no cost to the parents.79 When a school system 
offers to provide an appropriate education, as defined in the 
student's IEP, at the expense of the public, then it has fur-
nished a free appropriate public education. so However, par-
ents who choose to place their child in a private school general-
ly are not entitled to receive reimbursement or payment for 
that private education from the public education system.81 
3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The IDEA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies 
before a private right of action accrues.82 Exhaustion general-
ly is required to prevent premature judicial interference with 
agency processes, so that, among other reasons, the agency 
may function efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its 
own mistakes.s3 Administrative exhaustion is based on the 
300.345(d). 
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401. See Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F. 
Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (collecting a portion of special education costs 
from parents violates federal law). 
78. See RoTHSTEIN, supra note 60 at 115. 
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401. See Johnson, 757 F. Supp. 
at 621 (district must reimburse parents for past speech therapy determined to be 
educationally necessary). 
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D). 
81. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403. Courts have identified a limited exception when fami-
lies, exercising a first amendment right to freedom of religion, place a child with a 
disability in a parochial school. In such cases, the public education system must 
provide the child with services necessary to fulfill the IEP in a parochial school 
setting. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (detailing the administrative 
procedure and safeguards in the IDEA). 
83. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). 
10
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idea that "agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary 
responsibility for the programs that Congress directed them to 
administer."84 Because administrative procedures were de-
signed to simplify and make more uniform grievance proce-
dures, they are presumed to be an appropriate vehicle to chal-
lenge government agency action.85 Exhaustion of the adminis-
trative process allows agencies to exercise their discretion and 
expertise, furthers the development of a complete factual re-
cord and promotes judicial efficiency by giving agencies an 
opportunity to correct errors prior to judicial involvement.86 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist.,87 the Ninth 
Circuit noted that Amphitheater had developed an IEP specifi-
cally designed to meet Dreher's needs, as required by federal 
law.88 Amphitheater offered Dreher a free appropriate public 
education had the parents chosen to accept the IEP.89 The 
court found the special education services provided to Dreher 
at the Academy inconsistent with the IEP, because they did 
not meet her educational needs as determined by Amphithe-
ater.90 
According to the IDEA, should parents wish to modify an 
IEP, they must bring an appeal through a specific hearing 
process, and exhaust all administrative remedies prior to judi-
cial review.91 Although Dreher's parents exhausted an admin-
istrative review of the 1989-90 IEP, they did not pursue the 
two subsequent IEPs, against which they offered identical com-
84. Hoeft v. Tuc80n Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086 (1992». 
85. Id. at 1302-04. 
86. Id. at 1302. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 
(1969) (discussing policies regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
87. 22 F.3d at 228 (9th Cir. 1994). 
88. Id. at 230. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
89. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 231. 
90.Id. 
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 states, in relevant part: "Whenever a complaint has been 
received . . . the parents . . . shall have an opportunity for an impartial due pro-
cess hearing which shall be conducted by the state educational agency or by the 
local educational agency or the intermediate educational unit, as determined by 
State law or by the State educational agency." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). 
11
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plaints, through the process outlined in the federallaw.92 The 
Ninth Circuit found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to review issues arising from the subsequent IEPs.93 
The court reviewed the original complaint and held that 
the school district need not pay for services related to the edu-
cation of a student with a disability when those services do not 
conform to the student's IEP.94 Since educational services pro-
vided to Dreher at the Academy conflict with those outlined in 
her IEP,95 the court denied Dreher's claim for reimbursement 
of her speech therapy fees at the Academy, and found in favor 
of Amphitheater.96 
The court refused to consider the merits of the issue, 
raised for the first time on appeal, that Amphitheater violated 
the IDEA by failing to call a meeting between the parents, the 
private school and the district to formulate her IEP.97 The 
federal regulations require Amphitheater to initiate a meeting 
with the parents and a representative of the private education-
al institution which the child attends.9B 
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that no such meet-
ing took place, the court held that administrative remedies had 
not been exhausted regarding this issue since Dreher failed to 
appeal the IEPs for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 school years.99 
Because Dreher appealed the IEP for 1989-90, the court noted 
that the family was aware of the availability of such review, 
and failed to pursue it.loO Reversing the lower court's deter-
mination, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Drehers were bound 
to exhaust this issue through the administrative appeals pro-
cess prior to filing a private judicial action.10l The Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that, due to Dreher's failure to exhaust available 
92. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 235. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 231. 
95. [d. at 234. 
96. [d. 
97. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 234-35. 
98. [d. at 234-35. (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 300.349). 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 230. 
101. [d. 
12
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administrative remedies, the court lacked jurisdiction, and 
declined to reach the merits of the claim. 102 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit held that since Dreher failed to appeal 
the 1990-91 and 1991-92 IEPs, the administrative remedies 
had not been exhausted. loa Therefore, the court found that it 
lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Dreher's new 
claims. 104 
Dreher challenged only the 1989-90 IEP through the ad-
ministrative process and appealed that determination through 
the federal courtS. l05 The 1989-90 IEP called for sign lan-
guage instruction, the educational program component with 
which the Drehers disagreed. 106 The two subsequent IEPs al-
so specified sign language instruction. l07 Rather than reiter-
ate identical complaints by appealing the later IEPs, the 
Drehers focused their appeal on the original IEP. 
By noting Dreher's omission, the Ninth Circuit indicated 
that a complainant is required to challenge every IEP devel-
oped by a school district and exhaust administrative remedies 
for each one before a right to a judicial remedy accrues. lOS 
Under this logic, a complainant might not gain timely access to 
the courts, as a new IEP must be developed for each student 
every school year. l09 
However, when Dreher's original complaint reached the 
federal courts, a new issue was raised on appeal. 110 Dreher 
contended that Amphitheater violated the IDEA by failing to 
invite either the parents or a representative of the Academy to 
102. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
103. See Dreher, 22 F.3d at 235. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. at 230. 
106. [d. 
107. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
108. See id. at 235. 
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). 
110. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 234-35. 
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participate in developing the 1990-91 or 1991-92 IEP.1l1 The 
Ninth Circuit found that Dreher failed to meet the exhaustion 
requirement regarding the parental involvement issue, since 
she appealed only the 1989-90 IEP regarding sign language 
instruction. 112 
This seems a correct application of the exhaustion require-
ment, since Amphitheater had not been afforded an opportuni-
ty to correct its own mistake in an administrative hearing. 113 
Had the Ninth Circuit applied the exhaustion requirement to 
find that Dreher had no right to challenge the sign language 
component of the IEPs, it would have contradicted the U.S. 
Supreme Court holding in Board of Education v. Rowley. 114 
The court stated in Rowley that "[t]he District Court retained 
jurisdiction to grant relief because the alleged deficiencies in 
the IEP were capable of repetition .... "115 If the educational 
program component being challenged is repeated from year to 
year, requiring exhaustion of each IEP seems fruitless. u6 
Sign language had been repeated as the appropriate education 
method for Dreher in all three of the IEPs.l17 Therefore, the 
exhaustion requirement regarding the sign language issue had 
been met. 118 
The Supreme Court also held in Rowley that courts may 
review an IEP after a school year has ended, and, presumably 
after a new IEP has been developed. 119 An IEP does not be-
come automatically moot when a new IEP is developed. 120 
"Judicial review invariably takes more than nine months to 
complete, not to mention the time consumed during the preced-
111. [d. at 235. 
112. [d. 
113. See Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302 (1992). See 
supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for discussion of the exhaustion require-
ment. 
114. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). Had the court 
held that an IEP becomes moot once a new IEP is developed, regardless of the 
program component being challenged, the procedural safeguards built into the 
IDEA would be compromised. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. 
117. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230. 
118. [d. at 231. 
119. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186. 
120. [d. 
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ing state administrative hearings. In Honig v. Doe,121 the Su-
preme Court acknowledged plaintiff's contention that a party 
seeking review under section 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA must 
exhaust "time-consuming administrative remedies. "122 
However, the Court provided a method by which complain-
ants may bypass the administrative process in certain instanc-
es.123 The Court found situations in which it is inappropriate 
to require the use of the procedural safeguards set out in the 
IDEA before filing a lawsuit, including complaints that: "(1) it 
would be futile to use the due process procedures; (2) an agen-
cy has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general appli-
cability that is contrary to the law; (3) it is improbable that 
adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative 
remedies. "124 
Applying the futility approach, the District Court did not 
require Dreher to exhaust the administrative remedies by 
appealing the 1990-91 and 1991-92 IEPs regarding sign lan-
guage instruction.125 Subsequent challenges to the sign lan-
guage component would have been futile since Amphitheater 
had already determined that the oral method of speech therapy 
provided at the Academy was inconsistent with Dreher's 
IEP.126 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist.,127 the 
Ninth Circuit held that until a party exhausts available ad-
ministrative remedies regarding the education of children with 
disabilities, courts lack jurisdiction to review complaints.128 
School districts must provide a free appropriate public educa-
tion, individualized for each student with a disability.129 The 
121. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
122. [d. at 186-87 n.9 (citing Honig, 484 U.S. at 327). 
123. [d. 
124. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 762. See Honig, at 326-27. 
125. [d. 
126. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 761-62. 
127. 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994). 
128. [d. at 231. 
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(18)(D) (1988). 
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development of an appropriate individualized education pro-
gram for a student must include participation of the parents 
and a representative of any private educational institution 
from which the student receives services. lao However, the fi-
nal decision about the education methodology to be offered by a 
public school system lies with the school district. 131 
Parents may challenge a school district's IEP through an 
administrative hearing process containing certain procedural 
safeguards required by federal law.132 Once the administra-
tive process has been exhausted, appeals may be brought in 
the federal courts. 133 
In Dreher, the Ninth Circuit identified two distinct appli-
cations of the exhaustion requirement.134 With regard to an 
issue raised for the first time on appeal, the court declined to 
reach the merits of the claim due to the complainant's failure 
to exhaust the administrative remedies regarding that is-
sue.135 However, the Ninth Circuit held that appropriate ex-
haustion of the remainder of the claims had been attained, and 
reached a final determination regarding those issues.136 
Caren Jenkins' 
130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343, 300.349. 
131. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a)·(d) (1988 & SuPp. V 1993). 
133. ld. 
134. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 231. 
135. ld. at 235. 
136. ld. at 234. 
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